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Mindreading and Tacit Knowledge 
Abstract Debate over the nature of mindreading proceeds on the assumption that theory 
and simulation offer distinct characterizations of this ability. The threat of collapse objection 
questions this assumption, suggesting that simulation collapses into theory because both are 
committed to mindreading as tacit knowledge. Although both sides dismiss this objection, I 
argue that the threat is real. Theory and simulation are both accounts of mindreading as tacit 
knowledge and so the debate between them collapses.  
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1. Introduction 
The debate over the nature of mindreading proceeds on the assumption that theory-theory and 
simulation theory offer distinct characterizations of our ability to explain and predict the 
behavior of others.1 Theory-theorists argue that our ability to mindread is made possible by 
possession of a theory, albeit a tacit one. Simulation theorists argue that the inaccessibility of 
this alleged theory is a mark against the theory-theory proposal and offer an alternative 
account of mindreading as theory-less simulation of other minds. As characterized, this debate 
makes sense only so long as there is a difference between mindreading via use of a tacit theory 
and mindreading via simulation.  
Proponents of the threat of collapse objection (e.g., Dennett, 1987; Heal, 1994) 
challenge this assumption, arguing that simulation collapses into theory because both are 
committed to mindreading via tacit knowledge. While both theory-theorists (Davies & Stone, 
2001) and simulation theorists (Goldman, 2006) resist this conclusion, I contend that the threat 
                                                 
1 Mindreading should be understood as roughly synonymous with folk psychology, theory of mind, 
perspective taking, and so on. Gordon (2009) and other proponents of the Embodied Cognition View 
(e.g., Gallagher, 2007) take issue with the presumption that social cognition requires appeal to mental 
states. For the purposes of this paper, I do not question this assumption. However, my claim that the 
mindreading debate collapses should come as welcome news to proponents of the Embodied Cognition 
View, as it serves to corral their opponents.   
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is real. In what follows, I argue that those involved in the debate over the nature of 
mindreading should pay closer attention to the requirements for tacit knowledge, and that 
doing so reveals two important conclusions. First, Goldman’s account of process-driven 
simulation collapses into a variant of theory-theory; it cannot be saved in the way that Davies 
and Stone propose, nor can Goldman himself prevent the collapse. Second, the collapse 
extends to all other versions of simulation theory. In order to explain the ability to mindread, 
simulation must involve mental state ascriptions, and so there is no way to avoid 
characterization of simulation as appeal to tacit, psychological knowledge. By recognizing the 
collapse of simulation, we can abandon the view of mindreading as an entrenched debate 
between theory-theorists and simulation theorists, refocusing on the shared aim of best 
characterizing this ability.   
 
2. Two Views of the Nature of Mindreading 
Mindreading refers to our sophisticated yet implicit ability to explain and predict the behavior 
of ourselves and others in terms of underlying mental states—most commonly beliefs and 
desires, but also hopes, fears, hunches, and the like. Suppose, for example, that I am trying to 
predict whether you will go see the newest action movie at the cinema. My speculation about 
what you will do will almost certainly involve appeal to your mental states: whether you prefer 
documentaries, believe that box office ticket prices have become exorbitant, or fear going out 
in public. All of these—and more—will be used to generate my prediction. I arrive at an answer 
by coupling them with an understanding of how mental states connect to one another and to 
behavior. The disagreement between theory-theorists and simulation theorists concerns how 
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to best characterize this understanding that mindreading requires. In this section, I provide an 
overview of theory-theory and simulation theory, focusing on the versions developed by Stich 
and Nichols (2003) and Goldman (2006), respectively.2  
 
2.1 Theory-Theory 
Theory-theorists claim that our ability to predict and explain the behavior of others requires the 
possession of a body of knowledge about mental states and their interrelations, and further, 
that this body of knowledge is best described as a theory (Morton, 1980). Sellars (1956) is often 
credited as the source of this claim, as he put forth the idea of “folk psychology” in his mythical 
account of Jones—a (fictional) ancestor who initiated the practice of speaking about behavior 
as caused by hidden, inner states like beliefs and desires.3  
While all theory-theorists subscribe to the idea that folk psychological practice relies 
upon a theory of folk psychology, theory-theorists differ amongst themselves as to what this 
                                                 
2 My review leaves out what is often characterized as a third position: the Rationality view. Proponents 
of the Rationality view claim that when we engage in mindreading we are using a theory of rationality to 
explain how others should act and predict what they will do on the basis of our understanding of 
normative principles of reasoning and choice (e.g., Dennett, 1987; Heal, 2003). I view these accounts as 
personal level descriptions of mindreading that could be amenable to implementation by either by 
theory or simulation. For example, Heal’s notion of co-reasoning is often depicted as personal-level 
simulation (Davies & Stone, 2001).  
3 Lewis (1972) offers a detailed account of how this theory could be understood. On his view, the set of 
folk statements we use to explain one another can be conjoined so as to create the theory of folk 
psychology. From here, each of our mental state terms is defined by the role it plays in this theory (i.e., a 
belief just is whatever state mediates between the behaviors and other mental states that are listed as 
being related in our commonsense statements). These functional roles implicitly define each term, 
which can be made explicit via Ramsification: by conjoining all of our folk statements, replacing mental 
state terms with variables, and then existentially quantifying over those variables, each term is defined 
without circularity. 
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theory involves.4 Some believe that the theory is a set of law-like generalizations, exhibiting a 
deductive nomological structure (Fodor, 1987) while others contend that the theory is 
comprised of a small set of core heuristics (Botterill, 1996). Still others do not take a stand, 
allowing any body of internally represented psychological information to count as theoretical 
(Stich & Nichols, 1995: 2003).   
Stich and Nichols’ broad characterization is the widely accepted one, as it is compatible 
with the predominant information-processing approach to cognition. On their view, 
mindreading is theoretical so long as it “exploit(s) an internally represented body of information 
about psychological processes and the ways in which they give rise to behavior” (1995, p. 88). 
Stich and Nichols resist not only a particular account of theories, but also any particular account 
of mental representation or cognitive architecture. Leaving these matters unsettled is not 
intended as a signal of their unimportance, but rather as an acknowledgement that such 
debates are to be had within theory-theory and are thereby orthogonal to debates between 
theory-theory and simulation.  
Theory-theorists agree that, whatever its structure, our folk psychological theory is tacit. 
Some claim it to be only “weakly tacit” (Botterill, 1996), but most draw on an analogy between 
the tenets of folk psychology and the grammatical rules of a language (e.g., Carruthers, 1996; 
Jackson, 2000).5 In much the same way that we cannot articulate the rules we follow when we 
understand a language and yet have no difficulty speaking grammatically and detecting 
                                                 
4 Theory-theorists also differ in whether or not they consider the theory to be innate (Fodor, 1992; 
Carruthers, 1996) or learned (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990), or perhaps even learned by a process 
amenable to theory revision in science (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). There are also differences in terms of 
whether the ability is thought of as modular (Baron-Cohen 1995; Carruthers, 2006) or not (Leslie, 2000).  
5 For Botterill, a weakly tacit theory is one that is “unstated, but recoverable” (1996, p. 113). Chomsky 
(1986) offers a characterization of our linguistic abilities in terms of tacit understanding.  
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ungrammatical sentences, so too proponents of theory-theory claim that our everyday 
interactions with one another are guided by a folk psychological theory that we understand but 
cannot articulate. Aside from this analogy, theory-theorists say little about the nature of tacit 
psychological knowledge and the requirements for its attribution. And yet, the claim remains 
critical to the view. The reliance of mindreading upon tacit knowledge is often described as the 
“prevailing assumption in the empirical research on folk psychology” (Nichols, 2002). 
 
2.2 Simulation Theory  
Simulation theory is best understood contrastively, as an alternative to the dominant, theory-
theory view.6 Simulation theorists reject the claim that mindreading requires a sophisticated 
body of theoretical knowledge and focus instead on our ability to project ourselves into the 
mental perspective of another person. The simulation process takes various names: 
imaginatively identifying (Goldman, 1989), co-reasoning (Heal, 2003), radical simulation 
(Gordon, 1995), recreative imagining (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002), and so on. These views 
share a commitment to the idea that simulation offers an account of mindreading that is less 
burdensome than the one given by theory-theory.  
As with theory-theorists, simulation theorists differ in their particular commitments. 
Some believe that the ability to simulate others is underwritten by direct access to our own 
mental states (Harris, 1989; Goldman 1989; 2006). Others claim that knowledge about the self 
and other is equally accessible (Gordon 1986; 2008; Heal, 2003). There is also disagreement 
                                                 
6 Although all simulation theorists agree that theory-theory is the dominant view from within the debate 
over the nature of mindreading, some theorists have noted the significance of simulation-style accounts 
of cognition from the Verstehen tradition that predate theory-theory (Heal, 2003).  
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over whether the basis of simulation comes from our similarity to those we simulate (Goldman, 
1989) or from assumptions of rationality (Heal, 2003).  
 On the simulation view, the greatest resource for understanding the minds of others is 
something every person easily possesses: a mind of her own. On the assumption that all minds 
are sufficiently similar, explaining other people is easy—you just imagine that you are the other 
person. As Goldman explains:  
A fundamental idea of simulation theory is that mindreaders capitalize on the fact that 
they themselves are decision-makers, hence possessors of decision-making capacities. 
To read the minds of others they need not consult a special chapter on human 
psychology, containing a theory about the human decision-making mechanism. Because 
they have one of those mechanisms themselves, they can simply run their mechanism 
on pretend inputs (2006, p. 20). 
 
Goldman believes that the use of one’s own decision-making processes results in substantially 
weaker demands on the mindreader than the attribution of tacit knowledge. But given the 
broad characterization of theory-theory as a body of psychological information, as given by 
Stich and Nichols (2003), it is unclear whether and to what degree these two views actually 
differ in their commitments. This is the issue to which I now turn: whether simulation can 
withstand the threat of collapse into theory-theory.  
 
3.  Prelude to Collapse 
The threatened collapse of theory and simulation could come about in several distinct ways. 
For instance, simulation and theory could be discovered to be explanations of separate 
practices, causing the debate to collapse for lack of a shared topic of interest. Or the debate 
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could collapse because they each explain different, non-opposing aspects of the same practice.7 
Some theory-theorists now advocate a hybrid view along these lines, according to which 
theory-theory and simulation are each sufficient to handle particular cases of mindreading 
(Perner & Küberger, 2005; Mitchell, 2005; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002). These are both neutral 
forms of collapse, attributing the debate’s disintegration to a lack of genuine disagreement 
between the two views. 
Given the current emphasis on simulation as a plausible alternative to theory-theory, 
the worries about collapse here are different. The question is whether the debate collapses in a 
non-neutral way, because simulation fails to offer a distinctive, non-theoretical account of 
mindreading. If this form of collapse occurred, then simulation would become a variant within 
theory-theory.8 Over the course of the debate between theory-theorists and simulation 
theorists, there has been movement in this direction.  
While the initial formulations of simulation denied any role for theory in the process of 
mindreading (Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986), many simulationists now acknowledge that simulation 
requires some theoretical assumptions. This concession comes in response to theory-theorists’ 
observation that simulation requires at least some background theoretical knowledge (Stich & 
Nichols, 1995; Jackson, 1999). When a person prepares to simulate the mental states of 
another person, the theory-theorist argues, she must make certain assumptions. For instance, 
                                                 
7 These can be different forms of collapse. Imagine you and I are debating the rock star status of the lead 
singer of Van Halen. Our debate would collapse in the first way if it turns out I am talking about David 
Lee Roth and you are talking about Sammy Hagar.  It would collapse in the second way if we’re both 
talking about David Lee Roth, but I am focused on his stage presence, while you are focused on his self-
aggrandizing interviews.  
8 Which is not to say that simulation would fail to be the most plausible account of the nature of 
mindreading on offer, just that the account if offers would fail to be a non-theoretical one.  
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she must assume that she is similar to the person she intends to simulate, otherwise she has no 
reason to expect her simulation to be successful. Davies and Stone (2001) offer an example of 
the required assumption: 
Me-You Principle: If, in circumstances C, my mental life would be thus-and-
so then if O is in circumstances C then ceteris paribus O’s mental life is thus-
and-so (p. 142).9  
 
As this is a generalization about psychological states, it is a piece of psychological theorizing. 
And since each instance of simulation draws on something like the Me-You Principle, no 
account of simulation can claim to be free of psychological theorizing.  Many simulation 
theorists have been happy to grant this point (e.g., Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Heal, 2003; 
Goldman, 2006) and for good reason. First, it seems difficult to motivate why (or how) one 
could simulate without appeal to such a background assumption. Second, this principle does 
not challenge simulation’s role in the process of mindreading. The Me-You Principle affords 
theorizing a background role. Once one is prepared to mindread all that is needed is the ability 
to simulate, not theorize. Simulation remains intact and theory-free.10 
 These concessions—from theory-theorists and simulation theorists alike—narrow the 
scope of the disagreement between theory-theorists and simulation theorists. Still, how one 
chooses to characterize the debate’s current stay of play tends to reflect one’s theoretical point 
of origin. Theory-theorists characterize the reformed debate as one between “knowledge rich” 
                                                 
9 If one’s account of simulation (e.g., Heal’s, 1998) operates on assumptions about the rationality of the 
person to be simulated, then Davies and Stone suggest the following reformulation:  Norm-You: if, in 
circumstances C, one’s mental life should be thus-and-so then if O is in circumstances C then ceteris 
paribus O’s mental life is thus-and-so (2001, p. 143).  
10 Gordon (1995) has remained opposed to the concessions of detailed here, denying that mindreading 
requires one to possess mental concepts. Heal (2003) offers an argument as to why even simulation 
must concede a role for psychological concepts and generalizations. In his most recent formulations of 
the view, Gordon (2008; 2009) suggests his view of simulation is most amenable to the embodied 
cognition view.  
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and “knowledge poor” strategies (Davies & Stone, 2001, p. 145), while simulation theorists 
characterize it as one between those that recognize the importance of simulation and those 
that neglect it (Goldman, 2006, p. 46). The debate over the nature of mindreading persists, 
fueled by the assumption that theory and simulation make distinct contributions to the ability 
to explain and predict the behavior of others. 
 
4. The Threat of Collapse 
The threat of collapse objection states that simulation collapses into theory because simulation 
is itself the deployment of a psychological theory. The worry emerges because of the striking 
similarity between the descriptions of simulation and of tacit knowledge. The plausibility of this 
threat thus relies on the requirements for simulation and how closely they resemble those for 
tacit knowledge attribution. In this section, I review these requirements—as given in Goldman’s 
account of process-driven simulation and the Evans-Davies account of tacit knowledge—and 
then conclude with Heal’s argument that the former collapses into the latter.   
 
4.1 Process-Driven Simulation 
Goldman’s (1989) account of process-driven simulation was created in response to Dennett’s 
challenge to the simulation view. Dennett (1987) argues that simulation is possible only if one 
has theoretical knowledge of how things of the type being simulated function. If you want to 
simulate a suspension bridge, for example—speculating as to how it will withstand certain wind 
or traffic patterns—then you had better know a lot about suspension bridges. In much the 
same way, Dennett suggests, simulating psychological states relies upon knowledge about 
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psychological states. Thus, endorsing simulation amounts to an endorsement of mindreading 
via psychological theory and the debate collapses.  
Goldman (1989) responds by conceding that many types of simulation are theory-
driven. But he maintains that simulation via mindreading is different. His argument thus relies 
on the difference between how the simulation comes about in the case of suspension bridges 
and in the case of mindreading. Simulating a suspension bridge requires one to accumulate 
knowledge of how suspension bridges work because such knowledge is not something we 
possess without effort. There is no similar requirement when simulating another person, 
Goldman argues. We already possess the mechanisms required to carry out mindreading 
simulations—our own decision-making processes. Goldman thus invokes a distinction between 
theory-driven and process-driven simulation, the latter of which is meant to represent a fully 
non-theoretical alternative for characterizing the mechanisms involved in mindreading. 
 The requirements for process-driven simulation are as follows:  
1) The process that drives the simulation is the same as (or relevantly similar to) the 
process that drives the system, and 
 
2) The initial states of the simulating agent are the same as, or relevantly similar to, 
those of the target system (1989, p. 85).  
 
Goldman concedes that mindreading could come about via theory-driven simulation, but thinks 
theory-driven simulation is unnecessary because process-driven simulation is also available. As 
he sees it, employing a theory is a slow and cognitively effortful task, making process-driven 
simulation a plausible and preferable way of explaining how we go about predicting others. He 
thus concludes that we often predict the mental states and subsequent behavior of others 
through process-driven simulation. Starting from the same place as the person to be simulated 
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(a set of current beliefs and desires) and using the same process (the ability for practical 
reasoning), ensures that the simulator will arrive at the same, or at least similar, conclusion as 
the simulated. Goldman insists, “process-driven simulation does not collapse into theorizing” 
(2006, p. 32).  
 It remains unclear whether the difference between theory- and process-driven 
simulation provides sufficient insulation from the threat of collapse. Knowledge of suspension 
bridges and commonsense psychology may be acquired in different ways, but the difference in 
acquisition need not mark a difference in the nature of the knowledge acquired. That is, we 
may be forced to learn about suspension bridges through explicit instruction while our 
understanding of people is acquired implicitly, but in the end our understanding of each may 
constitute a body of tacit theoretical knowledge. Heal (1994) pursues this line of attack and 
suggests that Goldman’s view of process-driven simulation collapses into an account of 
mindreading in terms of a tacitly known theory. To understand the charge requires first an 
understanding of tacit knowledge attribution.  
 
4.1 Tacit Knowledge 
Attributions of tacit knowledge derive from the observation that we often appear to “know 
more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4). The idea that a person could know something and 
yet not be able to access or report on that knowledge invites skepticism as to whether the 
alleged knowledge actually exists. As such, tacit knowledge is not a concept invoked for its own 
sake, but rather one that emerges from a need to explain cognitive abilities that would be 
otherwise inexplicable.   
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An account of tacit knowledge must meet two challenges. First, the account must 
ensure that the person actually possesses the knowledge being attributed and is not simply 
behaving in a way that is compatible with such possession. Second, the account must guarantee 
that the person is using the particular form of the theory being attributed and not some other, 
extensionally equivalent form.11 Meeting these requirements is important—crediting a person 
with tacit knowledge is supposed to explain her actions. If we make appeal to such knowledge 
in explaining an individual’s behavior, then it had better be the case that knowledge of this 
theory was operative in her behaving as she did. If mindreading requires a tacit theory of 
psychological generalizations, for example, then attributing this theory to a person who is 
mindreading should explain what she does when she explains and predicts the behavior of 
others.  
 Many have thought that these challenges pose an intractable problem for accounts of 
tacit knowledge (Kripke, 1982; Quine, 1972; Wright, 1986;). These objections closely parallel 
those that arise in discussions of rule-following, and many respond by adopting skeptical or 
anti-realist views about tacit knowledge. Certainly, crafting a successful response to these 
challenges is no small task. But it is one that the proponent of mindreading as a tacit theory 
must take on board, or at least presume a way around, as they are committed to the existence 
                                                 
11 In the case of formal theories, two theories are extensionally equivalent when they possess all the 
same theorems, but those theorems are derived from different axioms. In non-formal cases, two 
theories are extensionally equivalent when they explain all and only the same phenomena but through 
appeal to different principles.  
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of such a theory.12 So while one could adopt a skeptical or anti-realist position regarding tacit 
knowledge, it is not an option of which the theory-theorist can avail herself.  
Evans (1985) has proposed an account tacit knowledge that meets these challenges, 
explaining how a particular tacit theory of meaning could be attributed to a speaker of a given 
language. Davies (1987; 1989; 1995) has built a general theory of tacit knowledge from Evans’ 
framework. Although the view was not developed with an eye to the issue of mindreading, it is 
reasonable to presume that theory-theorists would endorse the Evans-Davies account of tacit 
knowledge. Theory-theorists often draw an analogy between the tacit knowledge involved in 
mindreading and the tacit knowledge involved in understanding a grammar. As Davies develops 
Evans’ view, it is an account focused on articulating tacit knowledge of the latter sort (Davies, 
1989). While theory-theorists have never explicitly endorsed the view, neither have they denied 
it or proposed an alternative.  
Evans argues that the two aforementioned challenges can be met by characterizing the 
tacit knowledge in terms of “full blooded” dispositions: causal states of the person that give rise 
to the behavior (1985, p. 329).13 If such dispositional states can be identified and isolated, then 
there is potential for a match between the set of transitions characterized by the disposition 
and the set of inferences governed by the theory we want to attribute. That is, a person can be 
said to be using a tacit theory (and not merely acting in a way that conforms to it) if there is a 
match between the axioms knowledge of that theory. Call this the mirroring constraint. 
                                                 
12 Recall from the overview in section 2.1 that the idea of mindreading as tacit knowledge has been 
termed a “prevailing assumption” in the field. 
13 In requiring that these dispositions be full-blooded Evans is intending to block an anti-causal construal 
of these dispositional claims as logically equivalent to conditional statements, as is characteristic of the 
Rylean approach to dispositions (Ryle, 1949).  
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Davies (1989) gives the example of a person who is being credited with tacit knowledge 
of the letter-sound correspondence rules that are employed for reading aloud. One rule in this 
system would be that all words that start with d should be pronounced /D/. In this case, the 
question is whether a person (tacitly) knows this rule, or has simply memorized the 
pronunciations for dancer, delusional, doctrinarian, etc. individually. On the Evans-Davies 
account, the difference between these two proposals can be determined by close observation 
of the causal-explanatory structure inside the person (Davies, 1995). If there is a single state in 
the person responsible for all pronunciations involving d-words, then we can reliably say that 
the organism has tacit knowledge of the principle of d-pronunciation. Given that recognition of 
the letter d reliably results in /D/ pronunciations, one might go so far as to say that attribution 
tacit knowledge of the d-/D/ rule is the only way to explain this behavior. From here, crediting 
the person with a particular (tacit) theory of letter-sound correspondences is simply a matter of 
scaling up: matching transitions between letters and pronunciations to the set of pronunciation 
principles that comprise the theory one claims is tacitly known. This characterization of a 
speaker’s knowledge meets the mirroring constraint because it makes possible a close parallel 
between the structure of the theory and the structure of the speaker’s ability. This allows the 
theory to be distinguished from its competitors and for it to feature in explanations of the 
speaker’s competence.14 
 
                                                 
14 Heal (1994) worries that this account of tacit knowledge is too promiscuous: certain systems may 
exhibit these transitions even while they are not candidates for knowledge attribution of any sort, tacit 
or otherwise. Both Peacocke (1994) and Davies and Stone (2001) argue that this can be done by 
restricting tacit knowledge attribution to representational systems. I do not elaborate on this restriction 
here. 
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4.3 Process-Driven Simulation as Tacit Knowledge 
How does tacit knowledge entail the collapse of simulation? Recall that Goldman’s account of 
process-driven simulation requires that the transitions being made within the mind of the 
simulator are sufficiently similar to those being made within the mind of the person being 
simulated. Process-driven simulation works when the simulator mirrors the mental transitions 
of the person she is trying to explain or predict. Although simulation theorists do not focus on 
this possibility, there could also be a theory of how mental states interact with one another 
during simulation that mirrors both the simulator and simulated. This theory will include 
inferences about the relations between mental states and the connections between mental 
states and behavior; it will be a psychological theory. Such a theory would meet the mirroring 
constraint identified above.   
 As Heal explains, the structural match required for tacit knowledge attribution is 
practically guaranteed by the goal of simulation: 
The input and output to the supposed simulation process are both 
explicitly represented psychological states…given this, then it seems likely 
that we shall discover certain patterns of causal dependence between 
input representations and output representations. And it is also probable 
that the pattern will have an overall shape which strongly suggests interior 
mediating structures of the kind which in turn license attribution of 
knowledge of a tacit theory. This is so because, ex hypothesi, we are 
imagining that there could be some theory which would produce the 
same, i.e. the successful, predictions (1994, p. 131).  
 
If Heal’s threat meets its mark, then Goldman’s attempt to avoid the collapse of theory-driven 
simulation fails. Process-driven simulation amounts to endorsement of a tacitly known 
psychological theory.  
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5. Responding to the Threat 
5.1 Saving Simulation  
 
Davies and Stone (2001) argue that Goldman’s view of simulation can withstand this threat of 
collapse. They begin by granting Heal’s claim, in the form of a conditional: if the states used in 
simulation involve systematic transitions between psychological representations, then 
simulation is tacit knowledge of a psychological theory. They deny, however, that instances of 
process-driven simulation involve such transitions. In simulation, the transitions occur between 
non-psychological statements about the world, and so, the view avoids collapsing into a variant 
of theory-theory.  
 Davies and Stone illustrate simulation’s continued viability with an example. Suppose 
Vincent is trying to predict what Yvonne believes. Vincent knows, for example, that Yvonne 
believes A or B and not-B and wants to know whether or not she believes A. According to 
simulation, Vincent uses his own decision-making capacities to come to a conclusion about 
what Yvonne will do or believe, given her current set of psychological states. Davies and Stone 
propose that Vincent’s mental simulation would proceed as follows: 
 T1: Statement of Yvonne’s beliefs (A or B, not-B) 
 T2: Own thoughts (A or B, not-B) 
 T3: Own conclusion A 
 T4: Prediction: Yvonne believes A (2001: 160).  
 
The transitions from T1 to T2 and from T3 to T4 require Vincent to possess something like the 
Me-You Principle discussed in Section 3. This is unproblematic, as most simulation theorists—
including Goldman—acknowledge that simulation requires background theoretical knowledge. 
The threat of collapse concerns the act of simulation, which occurs in the T2–T3 transition. 
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Does the simulation that moves Vincent from T2 to T3 require the possession of tacit 
psychological knowledge?   
In the example above, the T2–T3 transition reflects Vincent’s tacit knowledge of the 
principle of disjunction elimination: A v B, ¬B, → A. This is not a psychological principle, but a 
logical one. That is, T2 and T3 offer the logical form of thoughts about the world, and the tacit 
knowledge involved in the T2–T3 transition is knowledge about the logical relations between 
claims of this form.  Since process-driven simulation stays viable so long as the actual process of 
simulating—the transition from T2 to T3—is made without the use of any psychological theory, 
there is no collapse. The T2 to T3 transition is devoid of psychological theorizing; there is no 
appeal to mental states. As they explain, “this [attribution of knowledge of the principle of 
disjunction elimination] is quite different from tacit knowledge of the principle that people 
typically reason in accordance with the rule” (2001: 172, fn. 117). So while simulation may 
require knowledge of a tacit principle, it is not a tacit psychological principle. And it is the 
utilization of tacit psychological principles that is required for simulation to collapse into a form 
of theory-theory. The threat, Davies and Stone conclude, has been avoided.  
Before responding to Davies and Stone’s argument, I want to pause and consider the 
significance of the strategy they have adopted. Davies and Stone rescue simulation not by 
denying that it avoids appeal to tacit knowledge, but by claiming that the tacit knowledge it 
invokes is non-psychological. They are thus willing to allow that simulation involves tacit 
theoretical knowledge. This save undercuts Goldman’s motivation for positing process-driven 
simulation, specifically his claim that it is more economical than theory-theory because of its 
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avoidance of theoretical principles. Thus, even if Davies and Stone’s argument succeeds, 
Goldman and other proponents of the simulation theory may find it a cold comfort.  
 
5.2 The Save Collapses 
Davies and Stone (2001) are correct that a tacit, non-psychological theory could avoid Heal’s 
threatened collapse. They are wrong, however, to view Goldman’s process-driven simulation in 
this way. Or so I shall argue. My argument against their conclusion hinges on the nature of the 
tacit knowledge involved in the T2–T3 transition. Davies and Stone argue that this transition will 
always be between logical formulations of contents about the world, and so will not include any 
information about the mental states of the person being simulated. In what follows, I show that 
this claim is not warranted on Goldman’s model of process-driven simulation, nor is it a 
convincing claim in its own right.  
 Davies and Stone’s construal of the T2–T3 transition conflicts with Goldman’s own. 
Goldman offers a diagrammatic model of a simulation routine. It begins with the information 
about what the person to be simulated believes and desires. Then, the simulator pretends that 
these are her own beliefs and desires, inputting them into her practical reasoning mechanism 
and generating a pretend decision output. Finally, this pretend decision is then attributed—as a 
real (non-pretend) decision—to the target being simulated. Goldman claims that the practical 
reasoning mechanism responsible for carrying out process-driven simulation is one that 
“normally takes genuine (non-pretend) desires and beliefs as inputs, and outputs a genuine 
(non-pretend) decision” (2006, p. 49). In his diagrams of the simulation view, Goldman 
represents different mental states with different shapes (e.g., squares for desires, ovals for 
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beliefs, and so on) and his depictions of simulation clearly show these various shapes serving as 
input to the simulation process (p. 29–30). Thus, Goldman’s simulator uses both beliefs and 
desires as inputs for the practical reasoning mechanism. In attempt to strip the simulation 
inputs of their psychological content, Davies and Stone have misrepresented Goldman’s 
position. If there is a view of simulation that avoids this threat of collapse, it is not Goldman’s. 
What’s more, Goldman’s view is unlikely to be the only account of simulation to 
experience collapse. No view of simulation can be as Davies and Stone describe and succeed as 
a characterization of our everyday practice of mindreading. Simulation requires the inclusion of 
mental state ascriptions. When simulating, it is not essential that I keep track of whose states 
are whose. In fact, simulation is supposed to involve taking on the states of another as one’s 
own and then asking, “What would I do?”15 But this does not mean that the inputs to the 
simulation are simply facts about the world, stripped of all mental predicates. While simulating 
I must keep track of what types of mental states are attached to the inputs I am imaginatively 
entertaining. Otherwise, my predictions will be prone to error, if not impossible to complete.  
 To see this point, consider the sorts of prediction that are commonly at issue in 
mindreading. Say that Vincent is again predicting Yvonne’s beliefs and actions. Vincent knows 
that Yvonne has a standing desire to visit the zoo, and a conditional belief that if it is sunny, 
then she will go to the zoo. He also knows that she believes that it is currently sunny outside. 
Vincent inputs this information about Yvonne’s mental states into his own practical reasoning 
                                                 
15 Heal has suggested otherwise, worrying about instances in which one might “lose grip on the 
distinction between [her]self and others” (1994, p. 136). But it is hard to understand how simulation 
could account for the difference between asking what would I do if I were X? and what would X do if she 
were me? In fact, the simulation view gathers its plausibility from the idea that one’s own reasoning 
mechanisms can be used in a general fashion to entertain what anyone would do given a certain initial 
set of beliefs and desires.   
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mechanism as a set of hypothetical beliefs and desires. The simulation yields the conclusion 
that he, under those circumstances, would go to the zoo. And so he predicts that Yvonne will 
(most likely) go to the zoo. Vincent only arrives at this conclusion if he keeps track of which of 
these inputs are of which mental state type. Starting from a simulation that involves Yvonne’s 
desire that it be sunny yields a different prediction than one that begins from her belief that it is 
sunny. Failure to distinguish the two would lead to massive errors in mindreading, the sort that 
we easily avoid in our everyday use of this ability. This is a rather oversimplified example. In real 
cases of prediction we are often entertaining complex combinations of several different 
psychological states, including states beyond the propositional attitudes that Goldman urges us 
to consider. Thus, any further consideration of what mindreading requires will only make this 
claim stronger.  
 Davies and Stone’s assertion that the tacit knowledge involved in simulations is non-
psychological is in conflict with the way practical reasoning works. Mindreading requires more 
than information about the world; it also requires information about minds. To characterize the 
ability otherwise is to lose sight of the distinction between reasoning and using one’s ability to 
reason in the process of mindreading. Without this distinction we lose sight of what is thought 
to be unique about this ability: the way in which it involves taking an individual’s perspective on 
the world into account when predicting how she will act or explaining why she acted in the way 
that she did.  
 It is true that a lot, perhaps even most, of the items that go into our practical reasoning 
are claims about the world, or they are at least beliefs that the world is a particular way. 
However, such claims do not represent the entirety of the states involved in decision-making. 
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Practical reasoning can also involve input about one’s other psychological states, desires, 
hopes, fears, and the like, and how such states help to pick out and distinguish between the 
relevant factual beliefs. A sub-component of practical reasoning may deal exclusively with 
factual beliefs; Goldman calls such a module the factual-reasoning center. However, this 
processing will only be a part of what takes place in simulation and thus will not explain the T2–
T3 transition in its entirety.  
It could be objected that there are other ways of explaining the relation between the 
tacit knowledge attribution and the representations involved in the mindreading system. That 
is, the tacit knowledge could consist in what the representations are about rather than what 
explains the transitions between representations, as I argued in the last section.16 Perhaps this 
account of representation would allow Davies and Stone’s (2001) account to withstand my 
objection by making the representations of the simulator be thoughts about the world. In the 
zoo example, Davis and Stone could say that, during the simulation process, Vincent’s tacit 
theory is really about a relationship between sunny days and zoo visiting, not about anything 
going on in Yvonne’s mind. If Vincent wants to simulate weather patterns, then such 
representations would work well.  
This reformulation will not save simulation from collapse. In the case under 
consideration, Vincent wants to simulate Yvonne’s state of mind. His interest in the relation 
between sunny days and zoo visiting is parasitic upon his interest in how Yvonne thinks about 
these things. Any representations he employs in the simulation process will have to be 
representations of Yvonne’s psychological states. Without her perspective, the general 
                                                 
16 I am grateful to William Ramsey for this suggestion. The account of representation proposed is what 
he terms S-representation (2007, p. 77–92).  
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knowledge is ineffective. Critical to the characterization of this ability as mindreading is the 
sensitivity of this ability to minds. This alternative account of representation fails to prevent the 
collapse of simulation. 
Others have used Davies and Stone’s argument as the basis for generating hybrid 
accounts of mindreading, which appeal to both theory and simulation.17 Perner and Rühberger 
(2005) offer such a view. They argue that simulation is used in cases where we lack an available 
theory and simply model the world with an analogous system. In creating this hybrid, Perner 
and Rühberger rely explicitly on the distinction provided by Davies and Stone, wherein the 
difference between theory and simulation involves whether the tacit knowledge is 
psychological.  
Perner and Rühberger’s account is but one example.18 Such hybrid views offer 
interesting, and even plausible, accounts of the nature of mindreading, but they misunderstand 
the implications of collapse. The threat of collapse challenges the credibility of the distinction 
between theory and simulation. If the threat succeeds, as I have argued it does, then theory 
and simulation are not alternative accounts of how mindreading occurs. Mindreading may 
involve a variety of processes, as hybrid views urge us to consider, but each process makes use 
of a tacit psychological theory.  As Wringe explains the result of collapse, “any aspect of our 
mentalising which can be accounted for by reference to our possession of a capacity to simulate 
can ipso facto be accounted for by reference to our possession of a theory” (2009, p. 226). The 
implications of collapse thus apply to all attempts to distinguish between theory and 
                                                 
17 Wringe (2009) calls these “mixed views.” 
18 Others include Carruthers (1996) and Stich and Nichols (2003).  
 24 
simulation, whether they are drawn between accounts of mindreading or within a single 
account.  
 
6. Responding to the Collapse 
Although Davies and Stone were unable to save Goldman’s simulation view from collapse into a 
variant of theory-theory, there may be other ways of responding that could prevent, or at least 
mitigate, the collapse. In this section, I consider three. First, Goldman himself may have a way 
of responding to the collapse that threatens his view. Second, one could avoid collapse by 
rejecting the account of tacit knowledge by which it is achieved, an approach suggested by 
Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). Third, one could concede collapse, but claim victory for 
simulation on other grounds. Wringe (2009) advocates a version of this final strategy, 
suggesting that simulation may be preferable to other forms of theory-theory because of the 
explanatory depth it provides.  
In what follows, I argue that neither of the first two strategies will be able to prevent the 
collapse of simulation into theory. Both recommend jettisoning the Evans-Davies account of 
tacit knowledge, but do so without suggesting an alternative. Leaving the mindreading debate 
without an account of tacit knowledge, I will show, does more harm than good. Finally, I 
suggest that Wringe’s acknowledgment of simulation’s explanatory virtues is interesting, but 





6.1 Goldman’s Response  
Goldman’s own discussion of the threat of collapse goes little beyond the points made by 
Davies and Stone. In fact, Goldman claims that Davies and Stone have rejected Heal’s account 
of tacit knowledge (2006, p. 55-56). Davies and Stone do offer a refinement of Heal’s 
proposal—emphasizing restrictions on what kinds of systems can be credited with tacit 
knowledge—but in doing so they continue to assert that there is a viable account of tacit 
knowledge and that Goldman appeals to it. As I noted in section 5.1, their argumentative 
strategy involves granting Heal her desired conclusion, albeit in conditional form: if the states 
used in simulation involve systematic transitions between psychological representations, then 
simulation is tacit knowledge of a psychological theory. Their key move is to argue against 
collapse by showing that the tacit knowledge to which Goldman appeals is non-psychological. 
As we now see, this save cannot work: for Goldman, the transitions involved in simulation are 
psychological.  
Ultimately, Goldman rests his rejection of the collapse on the supposedly obvious 
distinction between theory and simulation:  
On the surface, there is a tolerably clear contrast between (mere) theory 
and simulation. In light of the contrast, it is prima facie implausible that 
evidence for a simulation routine should also and equally be evidence for a 
theory routine. Thus, any account of tacit knowledge that implies that the 
occurrence of a simulation entails the possession of a tacitly known theory 
is prima facie implausible and should be resisted (2006, p. 56).  
 
Goldman’s insistence on a “tolerably clear contrast” between theory and simulation involves a 
faulty characterization of theory-theory as requiring lawlike generalizations (p. 28). As discussed 
in Section 2, Stich and Nichols (2003) make no such requirement. Further, this response fails to 
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acknowledge the challenge that the threat of collapse poses to simulation: the threat comes 
about precisely because the distinction between theory and simulation is not clear.  
Most importantly, Goldman has the issue turned around. What needs to be established 
is that there is a distinction between the accounts of mindreading offered by simulation theory 
and theory-theory, such than an account of tacit psychological knowledge would be 
differentially related to each of them. To simply declare that such a distinction exists, and then 
challenge any account of tacit knowledge to meet it, is to move in the wrong direction. 
Goldman has not managed to save his account of simulation from collapse.19    
 One might resist this claim by suggesting I have begged the question against Goldman. 
Why does the burden for reconciling simulation with theories of tacit knowledge fall to 
proponents of simulation and not to those advocating theory-theory? The claim may seem 
especially unfair, considering that theory-theorists have not said much about tacit knowledge 
either. I concede that both sides have work to do in this regard, but I do not consider this 
demand on Goldman, and other simulationists, to be unreasonable. The request emerges from 
the dialectic structure of the debate over the nature of mindreading. While theory-theorists 
have not done much to connect their account of tacit theory to the Evans-Davies proposal, they 
have advanced the theory-theory approach against the background assumption that such a 
proposal is available. Simulation, in contrast, emerged as an alternative to the dominant, 
                                                 
19 In fact, it may be one of the virtues of Goldman’s (2006) account that encourages the collapse. 
Goldman is critical of theory-theory accounts, in part, because of their focus on propositional attitudes 
like belief and desire. He urges that we look for a more “comprehensive account of mindreading” (2006, 
p. 20) that can account for other mental states (emotions, feelings, etc.) as well, and he intends 
simulation as just such an account. By using one’s own decision-making capacities, Goldman insists that 
the simulator enjoys broad access to a range of mental states. Given that Goldman’s account is directed 
toward increasing the number of mental states that are inputted into one’s subpersonal mechanisms for 
simulation, it seems unlikely that he would welcome a rescue of his account that involved stripping the 
inputs to simulation from their mental predication as Davies and Stone (2001) propose. 
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theory-theory view. It earns a spot on the list of candidate characterizations of this ability only 
insofar as it is reasonably distinct from other views already in play.  
 
6.2 Rejecting the Evans-Davies Account  
One could continue to press the point on Goldman’s behalf, by rejecting the Evans-Davies 
account of tacit knowledge via which the collapse is achieved. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) 
suggest this response to Heal’s alleged demonstration of simulation’s collapse into tacit theory, 
stating: “this result is more apt to be taken as a refutation of the theory of tacit knowledge 
from which it is derived than a serious objection to simulationism” (2002, p. 58).  
If simulationists respond in this way, it would prevent the collapse of simulation into 
theory, but it would hinder the study of mindreading in at least two respects. First, this move 
would push the debate backward rather than forward. One needs a principled reason to reject 
the Evans-Davies account of tacit knowledge, and none—other than distaste for its 
implications—has been given. At the very least, an alternative account of tacit knowledge 
should be proposed and should be shown to have distinct advantages over its rival. In the 
absence of such a viable alternative, it is unclear that anything would be gained by this 
rejection. To dismiss the Evans-Davies account of tacit knowledge simply to perpetuate the 
contrast between theory and simulation is to privilege the debate over its resolution.  
Second, and more importantly, the Evans-Davies account offers an important advantage 
for the study of mindreading. Specifically, it offers a way of determining—empirically—which of 
two (or more) alternative tacit theories is the one actually being used by the person to whom 
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the tacit knowledge is attributed.20 That is, it suggests a strategy by which various accounts of 
mindreading can be investigated in psychology and neuroscience. Recall the mirroring 
constraint discussed in section 4.1. This constraint, as given by the Evans-Davies account, 
stipulates a tight match between the inferential structure of the theory and the causal-
explanatory structure of the knower. Davies’ uses the example of the letter-sound 
correspondence rules that are tacitly known by those who can read a given language. The 
account he gives is rather generic, stating what would have to be the case to establish the 
existence of a rule of the form “all words that start with d should be pronounced /D/.” This 
example works fine for his purpose of illustrating the account of tacit knowledge. In 
psycholinguistics, researchers push the issue further, designing experiments that tease apart 
similar spelling-to-sound translation rules. By giving people sets of plausible nonwords to 
pronounce (e.g., items like gebful and gebic), for example, researchers can determine which 
tacit theory of spelling-sound relations best matches a speaker’s performance.21  
The same method is at work in empirical studies of mindreading. Since the creation of 
the false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), psychologists have been designing experiments 
to test when the ability to mindread emerges and how the ability should best be characterized. 
                                                 
20 Technically, Evans’ (1985) initial proposal offers a way of distinguishing a structured tacit theory from 
a non-structured tacit theory. Davies’ modifications to the account allow for ways of differentiating 
between alternatively structured tacit theories.  
21 For example, Treiman and Kessler (2006) use this framework to argue that the sound-to-spelling rules 
used in reading are best characterized as statistical regularities. Words like gebic and gebful are 
interesting because ‘g’ has both a hard and a soft pronunciation. The hard pronunciation, /g/, is found in 
words derived from Latin, whereas the soft pronunciation, /d3/, comes from words incorporated into 
English from Romance languages (and so tends to occur proceeding vowels such as ‘e’, ‘i’, or ‘y’). Most 
literate English speakers are not aware of the origins of English spelling, much less the differences in 
pronunciation associated with the roots of words. And yet, when tested on nonwords like those above, 
their performance showed sensitivity to the distinction between Latinate and Romance roots. Treiman 
and Kessler thus conclude that the sound-to-spelling rules (tacitly) known by speakers of English are 
sensitive to roots and context. This conclusion reveals implicit endorsement of the mirroring constraint.  
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The resulting literature is immense, and the debates are ongoing. Review of these studies 
would require far more space than I have available here. Even though the nature of 
mindreading unsettled, the empirical methods used to investigate this question suggest at least 
implicit appeal to the Evans-Davies view of tacit knowledge: the knowledge being attributed to 
the mindreader must match the causal-explanatory structure exhibited by her responses. To 
abandon the Evans-Davies account of tacit knowledge would be to drive a wedge between the 
philosophical and empirical approaches to mindreading, which up until now have been 
complementary.   
 
6.3  Simulation’s Explanatory Depth 
Wringe (2009) suggests a more modest victory for simulation. He concedes the threat of 
collapse—simulation is a version of theory-theory—but argues that, nonetheless, simulation 
may be preferable to other accounts of mindreading because it offers the most explanatory 
depth. This claim is intriguing, and is consistent with what I have argued thus far. My rejection 
of Davies and Stone’s attempted save of simulation shows that Goldman’s account of process-
driven simulation, and accounts of simulation more generally, collapse into views of 
mindreading via appeal to tacit, theoretical knowledge of psychological states. But nothing in 
what I have argued suggests that simulation collapses into a particular version of theory-theory 
already on offer, nor have I shown that Goldman’s view is false. Indeed, Goldman’s view could 
turn out to best amongst the alternatives, although all options on the table are versions of 
theory-theory.   
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Does simulation have more explanatory depth than theory-theory? Wringe 
characterizes depth as an explanatory virtue captured by the following principle:   
Asymmetry: Of two alternative true explanations, A and B of a phenomenon P, where A 
is true in virtue of the truth of B, while B is not true in virtue of the truth of A, B has the 
greater explanatory depth (2009, p. 228).  
 
Wringe argues that this asymmetry principle reveals the explanatory strengths that simulation 
has over theory. Vindication of simulation (B) as the true account of mindreading would show 
theory-theory (A) to be true, but the reverse does not hold. Vindication of theory-theory would 
not thereby confirm the truth of simulation. Simulation thus has more depth than theory.  
 There are reasons to be concerned with Wringe’s asymmetry principle, as it seems to 
capture cases of both explanatory depth and explanatory breadth. That is, the asymmetry 
principle will privilege explanations of the B-type when they offer more low-level detail than 
those of the A-type (depth), but it will also privilege B-type explanations that apply to a broader 
range of cases than those of the A-type (breadth).22 For now, we can set these concerns aside 
and simply ask whether simulation and theory fit the asymmetry principle in the way Wringe 
has proposed.  
 If theory-theory is understood generically, in the way that Stich and Nichols (2003) 
recommend, then it appears that simulation does indeed have more depth than theory-theory. 
After all, there are many different types of tacit psychological theory that would reveal the Stich 
                                                 
22 This ambiguity can be seen in the non-mindreading examples Wringe provides. The first is an 
explanation of a particular instance of finding a colleague is out of her office. In this case, he proposes 
that the fact that it is a national holiday (B) has more explanatory depth than the fact that her car is not 
parked in the usual spot (A). The second is an explanation of why a round peg will not find into a square 
hole. Here the geometric explanation (A) is characterized as having less depth than the explanation of 
the electrostatic particles of the peg and hole (B). The former appears, at least to me, to be a case of 
breadth, whereas the latter is one of depth.  
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and Nichols’ account to be the right one, but only one that would vindicate Goldman’s. But, as I 
noted in section 2.1, there are many other versions of theory-theory on offer. Both Fodor 
(1987) and Botterill (1996), for example, offer specific—and distinct—characterizations of the 
tacit psychological theory that mindreading involves. If either of these accounts were shown to 
be the correct one, then they would also have more depth than theory-theory broadly 
construed. Thus, simulation seems to earn its depth not by the focus on simulation per se, but 
by providing a level of detail that comes along with the focus on simulation.  
Prior to knowing which of these accounts of mindreading is the right one, speculations 
about this (or any other) explanatory virtue are premature. The asymmetry principle can only 
be employed when making comparisons between two alternative true explanations.23 In the 
debate over the nature of mindreading, we are still in search of a single, true explanation. My 
hope is that conceding the collapse of simulation into theory, as I have urged here, will 
accelerate the search. There are many issues left to resolve, but their resolution will come from 
within the theory-theory framework, not from a debate between theory and simulation.   
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that Goldman’s view of process-driven simulation collapses into an 
account of mindreading as tacit psychological knowledge, and that the collapse has implications 
for other simulation and hybrid views as well.  The study of mindreading is an interdisciplinary 
pursuit, connecting research programs in philosophy, developmental psychology, comparative 
                                                 
23 Wringe is sensitive to this point, as revealed in the following statement of his claim: “the simulationist 
explanation of our capacity to ascribe folk psychological states is – if true – deeper, and thus better than 
the theory theorist’s account” (2009, p. 229). 
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ethology, neuroscience, psychiatry, and many others. The articulation of simulation and theory 
views has shaped the nature of research programs in these other areas. Recasting the terms of 
the debate as I suggest could influence how research in these other areas proceeds, and may 
illuminate possible strategies for identifying, once and for all, the nature of mindreading.  
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